The
revelation on Wednesday that President Trump appointed Michael T. Flynn
as his national security adviser even though he knew that Mr. Flynn was
on the payroll of a Turkish-owned firm with close connections to the
Turkish government was accompanied by alarming reports:
Decisions that Mr. Flynn made about the war in Syria during his brief
tenure appear to have been influenced by his Turkish paymaster.
The
administration’s defenders may point out — correctly — that whether or
not Mr. Flynn’s policy recommendations while he was national security
adviser were made to please Turkey, they did not, in fact, materially
affect policy. But the point is that they could have done so.
The
main allegation raised in the news media against Mr. Flynn is that he
delayed planning for the seizure of Raqqa, the Islamic State’s
self-declared capital in Syria. Under plans handed over by the Obama
administration, the attack on Raqqa would have involved arming the most
effective of the militias fighting the Islamic State in Syria, a Kurdish
force affiliated with the Democratic Union Party.
The
Turkish government strongly objected to this, fearing it would
strengthen Turkish Kurdish insurgents, who have links to the party, and
Mr. Flynn’s lack of action is seen by critics as a favor to Turkey.
However, a delay was practically inevitable. Deep disagreement between
the United States and Turkey over which militia was going to be the main
partner in liberating Raqqa — the Kurdish militia or the mainly Arab
Free Syrian Army — was bound to hold up the operation regardless of
whether Mr. Flynn was pushing for delay.
Furthermore,
operational details, including plans to deploy a large American force,
were always going to make preparing for the Raqqa operation a slow
process. The drawn-out battle for Mosul, which started in October, has
induced caution among planners who have not only had to devise methods
to counter the Islamic State’s battle tactics but also needed to provide
for civil support and humanitarian relief.
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American
units could constitute a substantial part of the liberation force in
Raqqa, so the stakes are high. Central Command, which oversees American
operations in the Middle East, is understandably reluctant to commence
the battle until American forces are thoroughly prepared. And the
Islamic State is not going anywhere. Its fighters have no escape route.
As in Mosul, they will fight to the last man. Given these factors, only
fools would have rushed in.
Finally,
wholly independently of any self-dealing by Mr. Flynn, Secretary of
Defense James Mattis appears to favor caution when it comes to Raqqa.
Mr. Mattis understands the need to keep Turkey on board both for that
battle, for future operations in Syria, and the cohesion of the Atlantic
alliance.
So
the Trump administration can credibly claim that Mr. Flynn’s
foot-dragging on Raqqa was consistent with a larger concern for the
complexities of the project at hand.
But
even if Mr. Flynn was not responsible for delaying the assault on
Raqqa, that doesn’t mean he hasn’t done serious damage to American
foreign policy.
Big
decisions about strategy become much harder when the issues are
permeated by domestic politics. Of course, it’s never been entirely true
that politics stop at the water’s edge, but when the stakes for the
United States are muddied by domestic scandal, as they are in Mr.
Flynn’s case, then an objective discussion of the stakes for America, of
the very nature of our adversaries, and of the basis on which our
leadership is making crucial decisions becomes difficult if not
impossible.
Strategic
decisions regarding Russia have already been made difficult because of
the allegations that Mr. Flynn and other members of the Trump campaign
team colluded with Russian intelligence. For example, it wasn’t clear
whether Mr. Trump ordered airstrikes against the Syrian military because
he thought it was good policy or because he wanted to thwart
perceptions that his connections to Russia made him reluctant to
confront Moscow.
Now
American policy deliberations on Turkey could be similarly poisoned.
Among several serious strategic challenges the United States is facing
is the role of Turkey in NATO, which involves the stability of the
alliance’s southern flank, Turkish ties to Europe and counterterrorism
cooperation. The two issues that will make or break Turkey’s
relationship with the United States and NATO are whether President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan will succeed in crushing democracy and whether the
United States will endorse Kurds’ demands for autonomy in return for
their help in Syria.
Rational
policy discourse on these profound challenges will now be far more
difficult because they have become entwined in American politics and
Turkey’s ties to a former American general and intelligence official.
And that is ultimately because the president was too irresponsible to
exercise due diligence and sound discretion in making a crucial
appointment.
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